In this study, I investigate the effects of moral hazard in leasing contracts by examining the driving outcomes of all long-term lessees and owner-operators of New York City taxis.
I Introduction
experience on average than owner-drivers -and hence selection may be important as well.
To identify the effects of moral hazard separately from selection, I analyze proprietary data provided by the New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission (TLC) on all 17,972
New York City taxi drivers operating as long-term lessees or owner-drivers during the spring of 2005. Since an owner-driver internalizes the effects of his driving on the condition of his taxi, owner-driver outcomes provide a natural benchmark with which to compare lessee outcomes: After controlling for driver and vehicle characteristics, the expected lessee-owner outcome gap represents an important effect of moral hazard.
Of course, controlling for driver and vehicle characteristics is not straightforward: As with most empirical work in contract theory, addressing the possibility of endogenous contract choice is a primary challenge. 3 I address this challenge in three ways. First, I estimate the difference in outcomes between lessees and owner-drivers conditioning on a rich set of observed driver characteristics. Second, I conduct an instrumental variables analysis to address the possibility of unobserved driving risk that is correlated with leasing choice, instrumenting for leasing choice with community norms for taxi-ownership. Third, I compare the before and after outcomes of the 1,130 drivers who switched from leasing to owning during the sample period, which ensures the absence of endogeneity from time-invariant unobserved factors. All of these approaches yield qualitatively similar results. Finally, I
conduct two robustness checks. In the first, I demonstrate the absence of a primary endogeneity concern, the attrition of drivers from the industry based on their driving outcomes and hence driving risk before they switch from leasing to owning. In the second, I show that, as predicted, leasing strongly affects the violations rate for speeding, which is particularly susceptible to moral hazard, but not for seat-belt or cell-phone infractions, which should largely be immune.
After controlling for vehicle usage and driver characteristics, I estimate that moral hazard explains 21 percent of lessees' violations, 16 percent of their accidents, and 30 percent of leased taxis' vehicle inspection failures. While the characteristics of individual leasing markets varies widely, I interpret the magnitude of the effects in the taxi industry as moderately large, and suggestive to other leasing markets where the parties' payoffs are not perfectly aligned and lessors cannot monitor lessees' asset use at reasonable cost.
The current study also contributes to an emerging empirical literature on moral hazard 3 See Chiappori and Salanie (2003) for a discussion.
in auto insurance (see for example Abbring et al. (2003) and Israel (2007) ), where drivers similarly do not pay the full costs of bad outcomes. 4 These studies test for changes in driving outcomes in response to changes in insurance premiums, and find small or no moral hazard effects. The current study builds on this work in the following ways. First, it employs data with larger variation in incentives for good driving outcomes, which facilitates identification. In Israel (2007) , for example, identification is based primarily on the effect of $50 and $150 changes in annual insurance premiums, whereas the differences in incentives faced by taxi lessees versus owner-drivers is much larger. Second, the richness of the data allows for estimation of the effects of moral hazard on a wider set of outcomes and the use of a range of robustness checks. I interpret the current results as suggesting that moral hazard in auto insurance may be more important that previously recognized. 5 Finally, the results inform the debate about how to improve the levels of safety and vehicle emissions associated with taxi ridership. Since a moral hazard in the leasing contract explains much of lessees' inferior outcomes, policies targeting incentives are likely to be effective.
While this study focuses on the costs associated with taxi leasing, it is important to note that leasing provides a range of valuable benefits as well, including making the driver the residual claimant to fare revenue, which incentivizes effort relative to a fixed-wage contract, transferring some of the risk associated with driving from drivers to lessors, who are often better equipped to handle cost shocks, and facilitating more intensive use of taxis, which is notable in this market due to the regulatory limit on the number of taxis in service. In fact, the widespread adoption of leasing itself provides a testament to its benefits relative to available alternatives. 4 There exists a larger empirical literature on asymmetric information in insurance that does not attempt to identify moral hazard separately from adverse selection (for example, Chiappori and Salanie (2000) ), but there are important normative differences between the two that make separate identification desirable.
5 A related empirical literature examines whether observed contracts and firm organizations conform to theoretical predictions. See Laffont and Matoussi (1995) and Ackerberg and Botticini (1999) on sharecropping, Benjamin et al. (1998) on real estate leasing, Baker and Hubbard (2003, 2004) in the trucking industry, and Rawley and Simcoe (2007) in the taxi and limousine industry. Dunham (2003) provides evidence that employees, who do not bear the full cost of lower car quality, provide inferior care for company cars.
II Details of the driving arrangements
To operate a taxi in New York City, a driver must possess a taxi license (often called a medallion) that has either an individual designation, which requires the owner to drive at least 210 shifts of at least nine hours per year, or a corporate designation, which is free of owner driving requirements. 6,7 The number of licenses is essentially fixed and licenses are traded between private parties for hundreds of thousands of dollars. Under this licensing structure, drivers can operate in three ways: Owner-driving, in which the driver owns the medallion and the vehicle; DOV-driving, in which the driver leases the medallion but owns the vehicle; and lessee-driving, in which the driver leases both the medallion and vehicle.
Lessee-drivers operate under either long-term leases, which typically extend for months, or short-term shift leases, which are 12-hours long.
Responsibility for paying the costs of operation varies considerably across these arrangements. Lessors pays for vehicle inspection ($50 for inspection, free for first re-inspection, $35 for additional re-inspections), maintenance and repair ($4,000 to $10,000 per year), vehicle replacement (approximately $28,000), insurance ($7,000 to $13,000 per year), workers' compensation ($1,400 to $3,000 per year), licensing fees (approximately $1,000 per year), and fines for improper keep of the taxi (Urbanomics (2004) ). 8
Lessees pays for gas ($5,000 to $10,000 per year), tolls, parking tickets, fines for DMV and TLC violations, TLC fees (approximately $100 per year), and lease fees. The TLC sets a maximum lease fee, which industry participants indicate is respected in practice and binds for nearly every lessor and shift (TLC (2006) ). Lessees often provide a modest deposit, which is sometimes forfeited to the lessor after an at-fault accident. 9 Ownerdrivers often lease out their taxi for a second shift, and they pay both sets of costs when they do. Otherwise, they pay all costs except workers' compensation. DOV-drivers also pay both sets of costs, except for liability insurance and workers' compensation, which medallion-lessors are required to pay.
6 Much of the information in this section comes from personal discussions with industry participants and from TLC Rules documents made available by the TLC. 7 The owner-must-drive requirement applies to individual licenses purchased after 1989. 8 In 2005, the TLC required no-fault insurance coverage of $200,000 per driver or passenger and $50,000
per pedestrian, and liability insurance coverage of $100,000, $300,000, and $50,000 for non-economic losses per person, per accident, and for property damage. 9 In 2005, the TLC capped the deposit amount at $80 and $500 for short and long-term leases.
Two industry programs exist that provide some incentive for better driving outcomes.
The Persistent Violators program (and similar Critical Drivers program) stipulates a 30-day license suspension for 6 or more DMV or TLC points, and license revocation for 10 or more points, per 15-month period (completion of an accident-prevention course deducts 2 points). The Safe Drivers program reduces the bodily injury and property damage portion of the insurance premium (paid by the lessor) by 7 percent in the first year and 15 per cent in the second year if all lessees have no at-fault accidents in the prior 39 months and 4 or less DMV points in the prior 24 months.
For lessee-only taxis, the lessee keeps the taxi for the entire period, but must return it to the lessor's base every one or two weeks for vehicle maintenance. In case of a mechanical problem or accident during operation, the lessor typically provides a stand-by vehicle during the same shift to limit lost driving time, a practice which limits a lessee's cost of bad outcomes. The TLC requires that taxis pass a vehicle emissions and safety inspection every four months. In 2005, failing vehicles were typically kept in operation until the scheduled reinspection, which limits the cost to lessors of poor vehicle condition.
When owner-drivers lease out their taxis for a second-shift, they often find lessees through family members, neighbors, and friends, though anonymous matches are common.
For lessee-only taxis, a lessee typically chooses a lessor to which he has no personal connections. While most lessors have immediate access to the lessee's DMV driving history through a TLC database, leases are typically granted to any driver with less than two serious accidents during the prior four years, a term dictated by the insurance companies.
III The data
Data were provided to me by the TLC under a proprietary data-sharing agreement and contain information about all New York City yellow taxis and drivers during the first six months of 2005. I supplement these records with Census data matched to drivers using their addresses.
The driver-level data record for all drivers all accidents involving injuries or property damage exceeding $1000 to any vehicle involved, and all driving violations accrued while operating taxis. 10 The driver data also describe driver characteristics such as age, ad- The driver-of-record file identifies which taxi each owner-driver and long-term lessee is registered to operate on April 2, 2005, which I use to merge the driver and taxi-level data.
Medallion owners receive a significant discount on insurance premiums by registering with the TLC and insurance provider specific "named-drivers" as the exclusive operators of that taxi (including owners when they drive), and these matches constitute the driver-of-record file. Taxis with such "named-drivers" represent 9,535 of the 12,779 taxis in operation in the spring of 2005. Since I only know the driver-taxi match at this one date, I restrict the majority of the analysis to the six months surrounding this date. For long-term lessees, these data also record the current lease period, which is typically renewed in six months intervals (50 percent are between 177 and 183 days long, and 95 percent are between 147 and 189 days long).
I identify a driver as an owner-driver if he appears as a "named-driver" for a specific taxi, and also as the medallion owners as recorded in the TLC medallion-owner records, and in some cases supplemented with TLC receipts associated with medallion purchase.
In this way, the driver-of-record file allows me to classify taxis as exclusively long-termlessee operated, exclusively owner-driver operated, or mixed lessee-owner operated. The remaining taxis have "unspecified" drivers, and from discussions with TLC officials and industry participants, are nearly always operated by short-term shift lessees. Since these shift-lessees cannot be matched to specific taxis, they are excluded from the analysis. In the conclusion, I argue that moral hazard is likely larger for these drivers.
and seat-belt violations were also common, but I exclude them from total violations frequency because they do not reflect driving aggressiveness and no points are assigned. 11 I thank Bruce Schaller for providing this algorithm. 12 For 15 percent of taxis, the current period mileage is unavailable, often because the vehicle was retired and replaced during the period. In such cases, previous period mileage is used instead. Estimates from a sample the excludes these taxis are nearly identical to the estimates from the full sample.
The data are limited in that they identify only medallion owners and not vehicle owners.
Virtually all owner-drivers own both the medallion and vehicle. However, some discuss how the classification of DOV-operators as lessees will only generate conservative estimates of the leasing moral hazard.
Because of the importance of this driver-taxi match to the analysis, the accuracy of this match deserves some discussion. 13 I believe the driver-of-record file accurately captures the drivers of taxis with long-term lessees and owner-drivers: Medallion owners risk significant TLC and criminal penalties for allowing unregistered and hence uninsured driving on "named-driver" taxis, including medallion suspension, and ultimately are responsible for bad outcomes (recall that medallion owners are responsible for maintaining driver insurance). Nevertheless, I cannot rule out the possibility that unregistered drivers sometimes operate "named-driver" taxis. I discuss now two possibilities regarding unregistered drivers.
First, suppose that unregistered driving occurs more frequently for taxis I identify as exclusively lessee-operated. I believe this is the more plausible possibility since owners of lessee-only taxis cannot monitor who operates their taxis as easily as owner-drivers.
This scenario would generate conservative estimates of the leasing effect since mileage is reported at the taxi-level and not subject to underreporting while accident and violations are summed across the taxi's registered drivers to the taxi-level.
Second, suppose that unregistered driving is more common for taxis I identify as having owner-drivers (exclusively or mixed owner-lessee) such that owner-drivers' apparently lower accident and violations rates is in fact due to underreporting of accidents and violations for these taxis. I believe this scenario is unlikely for the following reasons. First, taxis I identify as exclusively owner-operated are driven 118 miles per day (versus 191 miles per day for lessee-only taxis), which is an amount of driving that is consistent with the 1.1 owner-drivers on average who are registered to operate these taxis (118 miles per day 13 I thank an anonymous referee for raising this point.
is approximately seven hours per driver per day at fifteen miles per hour). 14 This daily mileage level is inconsistent with owner-drivers operating full-time (that is, one shift per day) and also regularly permitting unregistered driving of their taxis. A second possibility is that owner-drivers operate part-time (for example, one shift every other day) but permit unreported drivers to operate part-time, such that I observe the mileage of one full-time driver but the accidents and violations of only the part-time owner-driver. While I cannot rule out this possibility directly, I believe this practice does not occur with sufficient regularity to affect the results. First, given the substantial risks associated with unregistered driving, it raises the question of why these owner-driver would not simply register the second driver. Second, the scenario is inconsistent with the existence of a leasing effect for speeding violations but not seat-belt and cell-phone violations (under this scenario, both speeding violations and also cell-phone and seat-belt violations would be underreported),
for which I provide evidence later. Table 1 provides summary statistics about the drivers examined in this study. There were 17,972 drivers registered as operators of specific taxis in the spring of 2005. Of these, 1,884 drivers are excluded from the analysis because key data fields are missing or contain original data-entry error. An inspection of these exclusions indicates that they are random in nature.
Summary statistics
Of the included drivers, 12,430 were long-term lessees, while 3,658 were owner-drivers.
As expected, owner-drivers tend to be older than lessees (51 versus 43 years old) and have more experience driving New York City taxis (18 versus 10 years). Nevertheless, considerable heterogeneity in age and experience exists for both lessees and owner-drivers, providing sufficient variation to identify their effects separately from the leasing effect. Collectively, the 16,088 drivers lived in 6,707 Census blocks in the New York City area.
Each driver lived in a Census block that had an average of 5.4 other active taxi drivers.
As expected, owner-drivers lived in wealthier neighborhoods, as measured by vehicles per capita (0.33 versus 0.24), median income ($44,937 versus $38,038) , and residents living in 14 Table 3 which is discussed in the next subsection reports these statistics.
owner-occupied housing (46% versus 28%).
Over 90 percent of active taxi drivers were born outside of the United States. Table 2 lists driver statistics by country-of-origin, and shows that Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, and In the spring of 2005, 12,779 taxis were licensed by the TLC for operation. Of these, 9,535 were registered as being operated exclusively by owner-drivers, exclusively by longterm lessees, or a mix of both, while 3,244 were registered as exclusively short-term lessee operated. Of these 9,535 long-term lessee and owner-driven taxis, 9,081 had sufficient data to include in my analysis, of which 2,008 were registered as being operated exclusively by owner-drivers, 2,040 had both owner-drivers and long-term lessees, and 4,994 had exclusively long-term lessees. Among long-term-lessee-only taxis, 1,938 were shared by two drivers, while 2,304 had three or more drivers.
Notable differences between owner and lessee-driven taxis are apparent from Table 3 .
Owner-only taxis were driven less than lessee-only taxis (118 versus 191 miles per day) and had lower odometer readings (118,328 versus 156,521 miles). These differences arise primarily because owner-only taxis are more likely to be driven two shifts per day (owneronly taxis had 1.1 drivers per taxi, while lessee-only taxis had 2.5 drivers per taxi). Drivers of lessee-only taxis had 62 percent more accidents and 64 percent more violations per mile than drivers of owner-only taxis (4.0 versus 2.5 accidents per million miles; 12.3 versus 7.5 violations per million miles). In addition, lessee-only taxis passed inspection on the first attempt 38 percent less often than owner-only taxis (40 versus 64 percent).
Figure 2 reports unconditional driver-level accident and violations rates by experience and driving arrangement, and shows that driving outcomes improve dramatically with experience for both lessees and owner-drivers. Owner-drivers, however, have better outcomes at all levels of experience.
15 At the request of the TLC, driving outcomes by country-of-origin are not reported.
Vehicle condition and accident frequency
Before presenting the empirical models of driving violations and accident frequencies, I
first provide evidence that vehicle condition does not affect accident frequency, and hence can be excluded from the models (driving violations frequency is similarly unaffected).
Every taxi receives a rigorous vehicle inspection (52 percent of taxis fail inspection on the first attempt), which includes a safety check of alignment, suspension, headlights, and brakes, every approximately 120 days. Since any defects that increase accident frequency would accumulate during the period between inspections, accident frequency should increase in the time since the last inspection if vehicle condition is important. Figure 3 is a histogram of accident frequency by the number of days since the previous inspection, and no increase in accident frequency is visible. 16
IV The effect of moral hazard on violations and accidents
While accident frequency provides a direct measure of driving risk, driving violations frequency also reflects this risk. In fact, Gebers (2003) finds that prior violations more accurately predict future accidents than prior accidents themselves (which is also a strong predictor of future accidents).
Empirical model
The empirical distributions over drivers' driving violations and accident frequencies are characterized by many zeros and right-skewness, and incidences accumulate through a
Poisson arrival-rate-like process. Therefore, I model the random variables governing driving violations and accident frequencies as Poisson processes. I provide test results later in this section in support of the Poisson specification.
The density of the number of violations or accidents experienced by the drivers of taxi
16 I also estimate a linear fit of accident frequency versus number of days since last inspection and find no relationship. Limiting the sample to taxis with higher odometer readings, and to taxis that failed the prior inspection, both of which may be more susceptible to defects, again shows no relationship between accident frequency and number of days since last inspection. Taxis for which the vehicle was put into service or retired (typically due to the TLC-mandated retirement age) during the period are excluded.
where the conditional mean, µ i = E[y i |·], is assumed to have the following exponential form, Table   4 as marginal effects calculated at the mean values of the driver characteristics, and the mean six-month taxi-level mileage (32,045 miles).
Column (1) contains estimates from a benchmark specification that excludes driver The outcomes of the 13 percent of drivers operating multiple taxis are distributed across the Kj > 1 taxis proportionally. That is, the number of accidents driver j has with taxi i is,
This reduced-form taxi-level model can be derived from a driver-level model under reasonable conditions, and is available from the author upon request.
of an important leasing effect is robust to a range of alternative specifications, including estimating a linear version of the model with OLS (reported in column (3) The pattern of estimates from the accidents models mirrors those from the violations models, and so I limit discussion to the primary result of interest, the estimate of the leasing effect from the specification in column (8) of Table 4 Comparing the violations and accidents results reveals that the estimates from the accidents models are considerably less precise. A primary reason is that accidents occur far less frequently than violations, and hence the accident outcomes contain many more zeros: Only 12.3 percent of taxis had a driver with at least one accident versus 32.3 percent for violations.
19 The estimates are also robust to excluding age and education, and limiting the sample to taxis operated exclusively by lessees or exclusively by owners as reported by the driver-of-record file. Since mileage is measured at the taxi and not the driver-level, and since owners of mixed owner-lessee taxis may systematically drive different amounts than the lessees, limiting intra-taxi variation in leasing choice may generate more reliable estimates. Testing the equality of the conditional mean and variance of the specification in column (2), a check of the Poisson functional form assumption, reveals modest overdispersion (σ 2 = 1.14µ).
However, the more robust negative binomial model returns virtually identical estimates and standard errors. 
Instrumental variable analysis
Any component of driving risk, r, that is uncaptured by the observed driver characteristics in X and correlated with leasing choice, L, would appear naturally in the empirical model in equation 2 as,
If equation 3 is the true model but is estimated without accounting for r i , then the leasing effect would suffer from omitted variable bias. I now provide evidence in support of the leasing results above by conducting an instrumental variable analysis.
The nonlinear reduced-form relationship between L i and r i due to the discrete nature of leasing choice, and the non-additive separability of exp{r i }, complicate the use of IV methods. As discussed in Mullahy (1997) and Wooldridge (2002) , traditional nonlinear IV methods assume additive separability of the correlated unobserved term, and generally produce inconsistent estimates when this condition fails. Instead, I use the GMM-based IV estimator proposed in Mullahy (1997) that requires no assumptions about the reduced form of L i .
The instrument I employ for leasing choice is the fraction of other taxi drivers from the same country-of-origin who lease their taxis. Table 2 shows that lease rates vary widely across country-of-origin even after controlling for average driver age and experience. There are several reasons for this variation. First, until 2007, the TLC required legal permanent resident or citizenship status to become an owner, and resident status varies widely across country-of-origin. It is also evident from The instrument is a good predictor of lease choice. The t-statistic for the instrument from a linear projection on leasing choice is 11.75, and a one standard deviation increase 21 Country-of-origin is unavailable for 28 percent of long-term lessees and owner-drivers. These entries are given their own category of 'not available.'
in the instrument predicts a 5.0 percent increase in the fraction of a taxi's drivers who lease. 22 For the instrument to be valid, however, it must also be exogenous in the structural equation. The instrument is clearly exogenous to any intra-country variation in unobserved driving risk that is correlated with leasing choice (for example, idiosyncratic preferences for aggressive driving). To address the possibility that there exists inter-country variation in unobserved driving risk that is uncorrelated with observed driver characteristics but correlated with inter-country variation in lease rates, I include as a regressor the mean driving outcome across all other lessees from the same country-of-origin (excluding the lessee himself).
The IV Poisson estimate of interest for violations, reported in column (5) of Analysis of switchers First, vehicle usage records are absent, and hence any systematic change in usage upon switching may bias the estimates of the leasing effect. Second, as discussed in section III, the data only record medallion and vehicle owners, and hence switchers are identified as drivers who switched from leasing to owning their medallion. While most switchers will have purchased their vehicle and medallion together, it is possible that switchers, more than medallion-lessees overall, owned their vehicle prior to switching (for example, if they 22 The linear projection is Li = ziΠ + vi, where zi includes the instrument, which appears as the mean across drivers of the taxi, the mean of the observed driver characteristics, Xi, and the log of taxi mileage with its coefficient constrained to one to account for the exposure variable; and vi is an independent error. 23 I estimate the IV Poisson model in Stata using program code from Nichols (2007) modified to include an exposure variable. Standard errors are computed by nonparametric bootstrap with 400 replications. 24 A 2SLS estimate is provided in column (6) for comparison, and also shows a leasing effect. The estimate of the leasing effect on accidents from the IV Poisson model is 0.023 (p=0.630) (not reported in the Table) , which is similar to the non-IV estimate, but is very imprecise.
purchased a vehicle prior to and in anticipation of purchasing a medallion), which would lead to attenuated estimates of the leasing effect. Third, it is possible that switchers are systematically different than non-switchers, and hence the estimated leasing effect for switchers imperfectly represents the effect of switching for drivers who chose not to switch during the sample period. Finally, it is possible that some lessees adjust their driving styles in anticipation of switching or switch after a period of good outcomes, which would also lead to attenuated estimates of the leasing effect. While I am unable to assess the importance of most of these factors directly, I believe that if anything their net impact will be to understate the leasing effect.
The large center panel of Table 5 contains the mean number of total violations, accidents, speeding violations, and seat-belt violations per driver for each of the six years before and after switching. Total violations, accidents, and speeding violations frequencies decrease noticeably over the period, with larger decreases near the switching period. Driving violations and speeding violations both fall by approximately 5 percentage points upon switching, though no decrease in accident frequency is apparent around the switching year.
As a check, I show seat-belt violation frequencies, an outcome that should be insensitive to moral hazard, and indeed, no decrease in frequency is apparent between the pre and post-switching periods. 25
More formal panel-data modeling of driving outcomes based on within-driver variation in outcomes over time is challenging: It is unclear whether the data contain sufficient variation to cleanly identify the leasing effect separately from time and outcome-year effects.
For this reason, and the limitations of the data described above, I believe the visual inspection of the mean outcomes by year is more suitable. Nevertheless, I estimate the following panel-data model of driving outcomes,
where j and t index driver and year, η j are driver fixed effects, δ t are year fixed effects, which are included to allow for the possibility that law enforcement or city driving conditions vary by year, L jt = 1 when driver j leases in year t and L jt = 0 when he owns, x jt is driving experience in year t, which will also pick up age and other time-varying effects, and y jt−1 is the driving outcome from the previous year, which is included to allow for the possibility 25 Cell-phone use during operation was only outlawed in 2002, and hence insufficient data for panel analysis exists.
that the previous year's outcome affects the current year's driving style and decision to switch. 26 Equation 4 is estimated using the standard fixed-effects Poisson estimator. I exclude outcomes for the switching year since drivers operate under both arrangements and driving style may represent neither.
The bottom panel of Table 5 contains estimates of this model. The leasing estimate for violations is 0.095 (p=.050), which is similar to the cross-sectional estimate from section IV. The leasing estimate for speeding violations is also positive, though imprecise. The leasing estimate for seat-belt violations is negative, though imprecise, which suggests that vehicle usage does not decrease upon switching, and hence that the positive estimates for violations are not due to lower usage upon switching. 27
In summary, the pattern of switchers' outcomes are generally consistent with the crosssectional results presented earlier, and provides reassurance of their validity. However, limitations of the panel data set prevent more precise inferences from being drawn.
Two robustness checks
While the results from the non-IV, IV, and panel-data analyses are all broadly consistent, the TLC data permit additional robustness checks. Second, I estimate Poisson models of specific types of driving violations, comparing the leasing effect for speeding violations, which is highly susceptible to moral hazard, with the leasing effects for seat-belt and cell-phone violations, which should largely be immune.
The estimates from these models are provided in Table 6 , and a leasing effect is apparent for speeding only. 28
V The effect of moral hazard on vehicle condition
In addition to affecting driving outcomes, the leasing moral hazard may also lead to inferior vehicle conditions. Vehicle condition may be affected in two ways. First, since lessees generally do not pay for maintenance and repair, they may practice inefficiently low levels of vehicle care (for example, accelerating and braking too aggressively). Second, since lessors do not bear the full costs of poor condition (for example, a higher frequency of breakdown, which reduces lessee revenues), a double moral hazard may exist in which lessors provide inadequate maintenance. 29
Empirical model
While a direct measure of vehicle condition is unavailable, the TLC data contain vehicle emissions and safety inspection outcomes for all taxis, which provide a good indication of vehicle condition. I assume inspection outcome is determined by the latent variable vehicle condition, c * i , such that,
where L i is the mean driving arrangement of the drivers on the taxi, X i is a row vector of the mean characteristics of the drivers on the taxi, V i is a row vector of vehicle characteristics, and i is a random component with a standard normal distribution. Vehicle condition depends on driving arrangement to allow for the moral hazard that may cause lessees to provide less vehicle care than owner-drivers, and a double moral hazard that may cause lessors to provide less maintenance than owner-drivers. Thus, the leasing estimate reflects both sources of moral hazard. Vehicle condition depends on driver characteristics to allow for the possibility of systematic differences in care across driver types.
This specification leads to the following index model of inspection outcomes,
between owner-drivers and lessees, which could affect driving conditions, are not determining the results.
If the estimated leasing effects actually represent a time-of-day effect, the estimates for speeding violations should be similar to the estimates for seat-belt and cell-phone violations. 29 Evidence presented in section III indicates that vehicle condition does not affect violations and accident frequencies, which implies that the double moral hazard is not relevant for those outcomes.
where the indicator variable c i = 1 if taxi i passes the inspection, and c i = 0 if it fails, and Φ(·) is the evaluation of the standard normal CDF, which implies the usual probit specification. The specification in column (1) 
Inspections results

VI Concluding remarks
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first detailed empirical analysis about the effects of moral hazard in a leasing market. These effects appear to be important in the New York City taxi industry, and provide support for a basic prediction of contract theory. The 30 Inspection outcome data are unavailable for 1,961 taxis because of missing data, often because the vehicle was retired and replaced during the period and no inspection was conducted, or original data entry. 31 The specification in column (3) contains estimates of a linear version of the model, and the lease effect is qualitatively unchanged. The results are also robust to limiting the sample to taxis operated exclusively by lessees or exclusively by owners to limit reliance on intra-taxi variation.
results would also seem to justify the presence of safeguards against moral hazard in other susceptible leasing markets, from security deposits to mandated maintenance schedules, that appear in many types of leasing contracts. However, these safeguards may only be partially effective, as taxi lessees often leave a modest deposit to cover vehicle damage, and are subject to license suspension for driving violations, and the effects still occur.
There are reasons to believe the current estimates are conservative. First, data limitations require me to group together drivers who lease their medallion but own their vehicle, who are less susceptible to moral hazard, with drivers who lease their medallion and vehicle together. While I describe in section III why I believe only a limited fraction of lessees are classified in this way, their presence will only lead to understated estimates of the leasing effect. Second, data limitations prevent me from including short-term lessees.
However, these lessees typically drive different taxis each day, and hence are less reliant on the condition of any single vehicle, which likely exacerbates the moral hazard for this group. Note: The dependent variables in columns (1) through (6) and (7) and (8) 
